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We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational"
in the sense that they face time-costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that
equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceable
future transactions unspecified and instead specify which agent has the right to decide these transactions.
Control rights allow the controlling agent to defer time-consuming deliberations on those transactions
to a later date, making her less inclined to prolong negotiations over an initial incomplete contract.
Still, agents tend to resolve conflicts up-front by writing more complete initial contracts. A more complete
contract can take the form of either a finer adaptation to future contingencies, or greater coarseness.
Either way, conflicts among contracting agents tend to result in excessively complete contracts in the
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A.Faure-Grimaud@lse.ac.uk1 Introduction
This paper analyzes a contracting model with two agents, each facing thinking costs, in
which equilibrium incomplete contracts arise endogenously. The basic situation we model is
an investment in a partnership or an ongoing new venture. The contract the agents write
speci￿es in a more or less complete manner what action-plan they agree to undertake initially,
and how the proceeds from the venture are to be shared. In any given state of nature both
agents face costs in thinking through optimal decisions in that state. Therefore an optimal
contract that maximizes gains from trade net of thinking costs is generally incomplete in the
sense that it is not based on all the information potentially available to agents in all states
of nature. By introducing positive thinking or deliberation costs into an otherwise standard
contracting framework, it is thus possible to formulate a theory of endogenously incomplete
contracts.
As Oliver Hart and others have observed, to understand why contracts are incomplete and
what determines the degree of incompleteness of contracts one ultimately needs to appeal to
the contracting agents￿bounded rationality:
￿In reality, a great deal of contractual incompleteness is undoubtedly linked to the inability
of agents not only to contract very carefully about the future, but also to think very carefully
about the utility consequences of their actions. It would therefore be highly desirable to relax
the assumption that agents are unboundedly rational.￿[Hart, 1995, p. 81]
The only departure from full rationality we explore in this article is time-costs in thinking
through optimal transactions.1 As will become clear in the formal analysis below, even
such a minimal departure introduces major new conceptual issues. But in spite of these
complications our quasi-rational model captures several important features of incomplete
contracting observed in practice.
One ￿rst basic result is that boundedly rational agents write what we call satis￿cing
contracts, which do not fully exploit all gains from trade that would be available to agents
1We develop the model of decision-making with positive deliberation costs more fully in Bolton and Faure-
Grimaud (2008). Our model builds on earlier work on decision-making with deliberation costs by Simon
(1955) and Conlisk (1980, 1988, 1996) among others, and on the literature on multiarmed bandits by Gittins
and Jones (1974), Rothschild (1974), Gittins (1979), Berry and Frystedt (1985) and Whittle (1980, 1982).
1who face no deliberation costs.2 In equilibrium, agents don￿ t waste time resolving all future
transactions and instead leave many decisions to be determined later. Agents will tend to
settle on more incomplete action-plans when they have broadly aligned interests, and when
they all expect to bene￿t substantially from the deal. Note, in particular, that boundedly
rational agents choose to leave transactions unresolved in perfectly foreseeable, describable
and enforceable contingencies, if these contingencies are su¢ ciently unlikely or distant, or
if they don￿ t a⁄ect expected payo⁄s much. In addition, contracts become more and more
detailed over time, as agents complete the contract in light of new information.
We refer to such contracts as incomplete contracts to the extent that they do not involve
complete ex-ante information acquisition on payo⁄s of all transactions in all states, and they
do not just specify state-contingent transactions based only on the information agents have
acquired ex ante. Contracts can always be made contingent on all the information available
to the contracting parties and in that sense contracts can always be complete. That said,
when agents choose to defer information acquisition on certain transactions to when a given
state of nature arises, they may as well write what is more commonly referred to as an
incomplete contract, namely a contract where the ultimate transaction to be undertaken in
that state is left unspeci￿ed and where a controlling agent has the right to determine the
transaction should that state of nature arise (see Grossman and Hart, 1986, and Hart and
Moore, 1988). Such an incomplete contract would often yield the same expected payo⁄as an
optimal contract that is based on all the information agents choose to acquire in a particular
state, and would be a lot simpler to write.
The main results from our analysis are as follows: First, incomplete contracts specifying
control rights may emerge in equilibrium (when such contracts are not strictly dominated
by a complete contract with the same equilibrium information acquisition). The rationale
for control rights in our model ￿de￿ned as rights to decide between di⁄erent transactions in
contingencies left out of the initial contract ￿is that the holder of these rights bene￿ts by
having the option to defer thinking about future decisions. Second, control rights tend to be
allocated to the more cautious party. Indeed, the more cautious party is then more willing to
close the deal quickly, even though it has not had the time to think through all contingencies,
in the knowledge that thanks to its control rights it can impose its most favored decision in
2We borrow Simon￿ s notion of satis￿cing for decision problems of boundedly rational agents to describe
a contracting problem between such agents (see Simon, 1955, Radner, 1975, and Radner and Rothschild,
1975). Interestingly, although satis￿cing behavior has been explored extensively in decision problems it has
not, to our knowledge, been extended to a contracting problem.
2the unexplored contingencies.
Third, the sharp distinction between a ￿rst contract negotiation phase followed by a
phase of execution of the contract usually made in the contract theory literature is no longer
justi￿ed in our setup. Contracts are completed over time and negotiations about aspects
that have been left out initially can be ongoing. In particular, the contracting agents may
choose to begin negotiations by writing a preliminary contract specifying the broad outlines
of a deal and committing the agents to the deal. The agents then continue with a further
exploration phase (which may be thought of as a form of due diligence) before deciding
whether to go ahead with the venture and agreeing to a detailed contract. Interestingly, a
party with all the bargaining power may choose to leave rents to the other party, so as to
meet its prior aspiration level ￿that is, the level before it has had time to think through all
contingencies ￿and thus persuade it to sign on more quickly.
Fourth, when agents￿objectives con￿ ict more, equilibrium contracts are more complete.
The main reason is that each agent may be concerned about the detrimental exercise of
control by the other agent, so that abuse of power cannot be limited by just allocating
control to the agent that is least likely to abuse power. In such situations the exercise of
control may have to be circumscribed contractually by writing more complete contracts.
Another reason is that when agents have con￿ icting goals they are less willing to truthfully
share their thoughts, so that the net bene￿t of leaving transactions to be ￿ne-tuned later is
reduced.
This analysis thus provides new foundations for incomplete contracts and the role of
control rights. In our model equilibrium contracts may be incomplete even though more
complete contracts (relying on more information acquisition) are enforceable. Similarly, con-
tractual completeness increases over time even though enforceability remains unchanged.
This is in our view a critical di⁄erence with ￿rst generation models of incomplete contracts.
Two important implications immediately follow. First, our framework allows for contractual
innovation by the contracting agents independently of any changes in legal enforcement. Sec-
ond, changes in legal enforcement may have no e⁄ect on equilibrium contracts if enforcement
constraints were not binding in the ￿rst place.
There can be substantial contractual innovation unprompted by changes in legal enforce-
ment as, Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg (2007) have strikingly documented. In their study
they track the evolution of venture capital (VC) contracts in over twenty countries outside
the U.S. and compare them to U.S. VC contracts. A key ￿nding is that although contracts
3di⁄er across jurisdictions, and thus seem at ￿rst sight to be constrained by local legal enforce-
ment, the more experienced VCs end up writing the same U.S.-style contracts independently
of the local legal environment. Bienz and Walz (2008) provide other empirical support and
￿nd that exit rights for VCs are generally only written into the contract at later ￿nancing
rounds, consistent with our hypothesis that VCs focus on exit rights only once exit issues
become more pressing. They also ￿nd that older, hence more experienced, VCs write more
complete contracts by including more control rights clauses into contracts. Another common
VC contracting practice they highlight is the use of ￿term sheets￿ , a form of preliminary
contract containing general clauses of the form ￿other terms and conditions customary to
venture capital ￿nancing will apply￿ .
In the ￿rst generation models of incomplete contracting theories ￿ a la Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1988) agents are fully rational but unable to contractually
specify transactions in some states of nature due to exogenous veri￿ability or describability
constraints. Being fully rational, agents will always write the most complete contract they
can, and contractual e¢ ciency is always constrained by enforcement e⁄ectiveness. Moreover,
since contract incompleteness is entirely driven by exogenous enforcement constraints, the
contracting agents are unable to limit discretion contractually and are reduced to only deter-
mining optimal control allocations over decisions that cannot be written into the contract.
Except that, as Maskin and Tirole (1999) have observed, rational agents may actually be able
to write complete contracts by circumventing enforcement constraints through sophisticated
Maskin (revelation) schemes.
Our analysis is closely related to a second generation of incomplete contracting theo-
ries, which includes Anderlini and Felli (1994, 1999, 2001), Al Najjar, Anderlini and Felli
(2002), MacLeod (2000), Battigalli and Maggi (2002), Bajari and Tadelis (2001), and Hart
and Moore (2007).3 These studies also provide theories of endogenous contractual incom-
pleteness, but based on other transaction costs, such as costs of writing detailed contracts,
or limits on language in describing certain transactions or contingencies. In closely related
independent work, Tirole (2008) also considers contracting between two boundedly rational
agents. Contracts in his set-up always specify a given action to be taken, but they are
less likely to be renegotiated (more complete) when contracting agents have incurred larger
cognitive costs. Although the basic setup he considers is quite di⁄erent from ours, similar
themes and results emerge, such as the endogenous incompleteness of contracts and the ex-
3See also the earlier theory of Dye (1985).
4cessive completeness of equilibrium contracts. Unlike in our model, Tirole only allows for
e⁄ort costs of cognition and does not explore the dynamics of contractual completion. He
focuses on a holdup problem and the value of thinking in his model comes from the greater
likelihood of solving a hold-up problem contractually up-front. Incurring thinking costs is
valuable primarily to the agent making sunk investments and is otherwise of no social value.
This is the main reason why contracts tend to be excessively complete.
Finally, our model and the second generation theories can be seen as attempts to formalize
di⁄erent aspects of Williamson￿ s (1979, 1985) transactions costs theory. As Williamson has
forcefully argued, contracts in reality are likely to be incomplete primarily due to the costs
of specifying transactions on paper and due to the bounded rationality of contracting agents.
Interestingly, a major theme in Williamson￿ s theory is that a key role of organizations is to
move enforcement away from courts and inside ￿rms, thereby dampening potential con￿ icts
between agents and thus increasing the e¢ ciency of incomplete contracts. As we suggest in
the conclusion, it may also be bene￿cial in our framework to impose limits on the enforcement
of contracts that allow the controlling party to exercise authority in an abusive way.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our model of contracting between two
boundedly rational agents. Section 3 characterizes satis￿cing contracts under the assump-
tions of non-transferable utility and communication of hard information. Section 4 considers
extensions to communication of soft information and transferable utility. Section 5 concludes
and an appendix contains the more involved proofs.
2 The Model
Two in￿nitely-lived agents, A and B, can join forces to undertake a new venture at time
t = 0. The venture requires initial funding I > 0 from each agent. If investments are sunk
at date t ￿ 0 then at date t + 1 the venture ends up in one of two equally likely states:
￿ 2 f￿1;￿2g. In state ￿1 the two agents get the same known payo⁄ ￿ ￿ 0. In state ￿2, the
two agents face the collective decision of choosing between a safe and a risky action. The
safe action yields known payo⁄s SA and SB, while the risky action yields either (RA;RB) or
( ￿ RA; ￿ RB). To make the problem non-trivial we assume:
￿ R ￿ ￿ RA + ￿ RB > S ￿ SA + SB > R ￿ RA + RB:
5Thus the only uncertainty in the model is which state of nature will occur and the payo⁄ of
the risky action in state ￿2.
At t = 0, the beginning of the game, neither agent k = A;B knows the true value of Rk
and each agent starts out with prior belief ￿ = Pr(R = ￿ R), which can be revised by engaging
in thought-experimentation over time as follows. If agent k experiments in a given period he
privately observes Rk with probability ￿k and nothing otherwise.
As long as neither agent has found out the true payo⁄ of the risky action, either agent
can and may want to continue to engage in thought experimentation. The agents can engage
in thought experimentation before or after signing a contract, and before or after the state
of nature ￿ is realized. Both agents discount future returns by the same factor ￿ ￿ 1.
Timing of the Game:
We shall make the following timing assumptions:
1. Technological Timing
At date 0, the agents can invest I right away or postpone investment. They can also
engage in one round of thought experimentation. Investment can only be undertaken if both
agents agree to invest.
Subsequent periods are essentially identical to date 0 until investment takes place. The
only di⁄erence is that the agents may have been able to update their beliefs about the payo⁄
of the risky action in state ￿2. Once investment has been completed, either state of nature
￿1 or ￿2 is realized one period later. When state ￿2 occurs the agents either engage in more
thinking, or choose an action. Once an action has been chosen, payo⁄s are realized and the
game ends.
2. Timing of the Negotiation Game
For expositional convenience we divide each period into two stages: a ￿rst stage when
a contract (or renegotiation) o⁄er is made and possibly accepted, and a second stage as
described in the technological timing above.
We make the extreme simplifying assumption that at the beginning of date 0 nature
randomly gives one of the two agents (the proposer) all the bargaining power and the exclusive
right to make all contract o⁄ers. In each period until the contract is signed the proposer can
choose to wait or o⁄er a contract to the other party (the receiver), who can either accept
or reject the o⁄er. If no o⁄er is made or if the o⁄er is rejected, the game moves to the
next period and starts over again. If the o⁄er is accepted the agents move on with the
6venture. If the contract is complete, post-contractual play is fully speci￿ed. If the contract
is incomplete, the agents play a post-contractual game, which we describe in detail below.
Information and Contracts
We assume that at date 0 neither agent has any private information about Rk and that
agents￿prior belief ￿ is common knowledge. In subsequent periods, however, each agent
can obtain private information about their payo⁄s through thought-experimentation. Each
agent can elect to disclose some of that information to the other agent. We shall distinguish
between the cases of hard information, in which information can be credibly disclosed, and
soft information, where communication is cheap talk.
We also distinguish between two polar contracting environments: one where the agents￿
utility is perfectly transferable (the TU case) and the other where utility is non-transferable
(the NTU case).
Throughout most of our analysis we focus on the case where utility is non-transferable
and where private information can be credibly disclosed. We consider the TU case and cheap





k ￿ ￿ maxf ￿ Rk;Skg + (1 ￿ ￿)maxfRk;Skg
each party￿ s expected payo⁄ under their preferred ex-post action choice and by
￿k ￿ ￿ ￿ Rk + (1 ￿ ￿)Rk




2 > I and ￿k > Sk.
Assumption A1 guarantees that the project is valuable for both agents when the safe
action is chosen in state ￿2. Moreover, both agents prefer the risky over the safe action
given their prior beliefs. As will become clear below, this assumption is not essential and
our analysis can be extended to the case where agents prefer the safe over the risky action
when they are uninformed.
We consider in turn the situations where the agents have congruent underlying objectives
over which action to choose, and where they have con￿icting objectives on the preferred
7action-plan. In the ￿rst situation the two agents can only disagree on how quickly to act,
or, in other words, on how far ahead to plan.
3 Satis￿cing Contracts under Congruent Objectives
In this section we consider the contracting game when the two agents￿objectives are con-
gruent. We de￿ne the agents￿underlying preferences to be congruent when the following
assumption holds:
Assumption A2: ￿ RA > SA > RA and ￿ RB > SB > RB:
Under assumption A2 both agents agree on the action choice once they know the true
payo⁄s.
The contracting game begins at date 0 with nature selecting the contract proposer. We
shall take it that agent A is the proposer and B the receiver. If B accepts A￿ s o⁄er, the
continuation game is dictated by the terms of the contract. If A does not make an o⁄er or
if B rejects the contract, then each agent engages in one round of thought experimentation
and communication before moving on to the next period. In the next period again A gets
to make a contract o⁄er, and so on, until an o⁄er is accepted by B.
The set of relevant contract o⁄ers for A under our assumption that utility is not trans-
ferable can be reduced to essentially ￿ve contracts4, C = fCR;CS;CA;CB;CABg, and any
probability distribution over C, where:
1. CR requires the immediate choice of the risky action r in state ￿2 following investment;
2. CS requires the immediate choice of the safe action s in state ￿2 following investment;
3. CA allocates all control rights to agent A following investment. The controlling party
can decide which action to take in state ￿2 at any time she wants;
4. CB is identical to CA except that it allocates all control rights to agent B;
5. CAB is identical to CA except that it requires unanimous agreement to select an action;
4There may also be a sixth contract, which we refer to as a preliminary contract. Under this contract,
which we denote by C￿, the parties agree to ￿rst ￿nd out what the payo⁄s of the risky action are and to
invest only once they have agreed on a ￿nal contract C 2 fCR;CSg. We consider this contract in subsection
4.2.
8Even if agents have congruent underlying preferences they may still have disagreements
under incomplete information. In particular, they may have di⁄erent preferences on how
quickly to invest due to di⁄erences in how quickly they are able to think. To see this, note
￿rst that when the agents engage in thought-experimentation in a given period, and share
their thoughts, they uncover the true payo⁄ of the risky action in a given period of time
with probability:
￿ ￿ 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿A)(1 ￿ ￿B):
Now, suppose that the agents ￿nd themselves in state ￿2 and are uninformed. If the two
agents delay any action choice and engage in thought-experimentation until they learn the
true payo⁄ Rk they can each expect to get:
￿￿
￿
k + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿










1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
can be interpreted as an e⁄ective discount factor.
Clearly, it is possible that:
b ￿￿
￿
A < ￿A and b ￿￿
￿
B > ￿B
even under assumption A2. In this case the two agents disagree on the best course of action
in state ￿2: A prefers to take the risky action immediately, while B prefers to learn Rk ￿rst
before deciding on an action.
It is helpful to begin our analysis by studying ￿rst the contracting outcome when both
agents have ￿unbounded rationality￿ . This corresponds to two di⁄erent situations in our
model: either there is nothing to be learned (￿ = 0 or ￿ = 1) or nothing that can be learned
(￿A = ￿B = 0).
3.1 Two ￿ unbounded rationality￿benchmarks
When either ￿ = 1 or ￿ = 0, the equilibrium outcome of the contracting game is to sign
a contract requiring immediate investment. If ￿ = 1 the contract speci￿es the risky action
and if ￿ = 0 it speci￿es the safe action in state ￿2. Indeed, in this case payo⁄s are known
and when ￿ = 1 agents agree that the best action choice in state ￿2 is the risky action (as
￿ Rk > Sk by assumption A1) and when ￿ = 0 they agree that the safe action is best (as
9Rk < Sk). Another optimal contract is give discretion to one or both of agents over the
















when the safe action is optimal.
To see that this is an equilibrium outcome note that since A and B￿ s preferred action-
plan is the same, when A o⁄ers a contract requiring investment at date 0 and specifying his
preferred action-plan, B is strictly better o⁄ accepting the o⁄er.
For the same reason, when ￿A = ￿B = 0, the agents sign a contract at date 0 agreeing to
invest immediately and to take the risky action in state ￿2, since ￿k > Sk under assumption
A1.
Importantly, in both cases there is no (strict) role for control rights and the initial contract
fully speci￿es the entire action-plan.5 This is not surprising given that the two agents can
write fully enforceable complete contracts.6
In contrast, as we shall show below, boundedly rational agents may agree on an incomplete
contract, which leaves open the action choice in state ￿2 and gives control to one or both
agents.
3.2 Full Disclosure
The typical contracting game considered in the literature boils down to a contract o⁄er by
the proposer followed by an accept/reject decision by the receiver.7 The central new di¢ culty
in our game is that both agents can learn something (privately) about their payo⁄s between
two rounds of o⁄ers, so that the negotiation game can evolve into a game of incomplete
information even though it starts out as a game of symmetric information. This is, we
believe, an inevitable feature of any game of contracting between boundedly rational agents,
5A contract giving full control to the proposer or the receiver may also be an equilibrium contract.
However, this contract can never be strictly preferred to the optimal complete contract.
6As is well known, when rational agents can write complete, state-contingent, fully enforceable contracts
under symmetric information there is no role for control (see, e.g. Hart 1995, or Bolton and Dewatripont,
2005).
7If the contract is rejected the game ends and each party gets their reservation utility and if the contract
is accepted the game proceeds to the implementation phase of the contract.
10who can each learn over time about their payo⁄s in the contracting relation. It turns out,
however, that the negotiation game reduces to a game of complete information under our
twin assumptions that: i) any information learned can be credibly disclosed and, ii) that the
two agents have congruent underlying preferences.
Lemma 1: Under assumptions A1 and A2, a strategy of revealing all new information
to the other party is a subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy of the contracting game for each
agent.
Proof: This observation follows immediately from the observations that: i) once the
information is shared agents have fully congruent objectives under the stated assumptions;
and ii) not revealing what a party has learned can only delay the time at which payo⁄s are
received and cannot result in higher payo⁄s. As each party gets strictly positive payo⁄s
(under assumption A1) it follows that immediate truthful disclosure is a weakly dominant
strategy. ￿
3.3 Complete Satis￿cing Contracts
We refer to equilibrium contracts as satis￿cing contracts to convey the idea that when
contracting agents face positive deliberation costs they may agree on contracts in equilibrium
that are satisfactory but not optimal from the perspective of rational agents who do not incur
any deliberation costs. We begin by observing that when the value of thinking is high and
the cost of delaying investment is low then satis￿cing contracts will be complete.
Formally, a situation with a positive value of information and negative costs of delay is
characterized by the following assumption on payo⁄s.
Assumption A3: b ￿￿￿
k > ￿k and I > ￿￿
2
The ￿rst inequality implies that both agents prefer to ￿nd out ￿rst which action is optimal
before taking an action. Indeed, under full disclosure (Lemma 1), agent k expects to get
b ￿￿￿
k when both agents set out to think ahead about which action is optimal, while if they
immediately choose the preferred action given their prior belief agent k only gets ￿k.
The second inequality implies that thinking ahead is not costly and in particular domi-
nates the strategy of immediately investing and waiting for the realization of ￿ before think-













while, under the strategy of investing immediately and thinking about the optimal action






































Under Assumption A3 this inequality always holds, since b ￿ < 1.
Both agents agree that in state ￿2 they will think before acting. Hence, the only advantage
of postponing thinking until after ￿2 is realized is to avoid delaying investment should state
￿1 occur instead. However, under Assumption A3 the expected value of an investment that
ends up in state ￿1 is negative.
Thus, thinking ahead of investing, and full disclosure is better for both agents than
investing before thinking. This implies that an o⁄er by A of either CA;CB or CAB at date
0 would be dominated by a strategy of waiting and thinking before investing. Similarly,
o⁄ering to invest immediately at date 0 under contract CR is also dominated. Therefore the
following proposition must hold.
Proposition 1: (Complete Satis￿cing Contracts) Under assumptions A1, A2 and
A3 the equilibrium of the contracting game involves thinking ahead of investing followed by
the o⁄er of either contracts CR or CS.
Proof: This follows immediately from the discussion above. An equilibrium strategy
for the proposer is to wait and think until the agents have learned and communicated the
optimal action. At that point agent A o⁄ers CR if the risky action yields a higher payo⁄ or
CS if the safe action is preferred. Given A￿ s strategy, B￿ s best response is to think until she
learns the optimal action, to disclose it to A if she learns it ￿rst, and to accept agent A￿ s
subsequent o⁄er.￿
123.4 Incomplete Satis￿cing Contracts
In contrast, when there is a cost of delaying investment one should expect satis￿cing contracts
to sometimes be incomplete. Such situations arise under the following assumption.
Assumption A4: b ￿￿￿
k > ￿k and I < ￿￿
2 .
Indeed, delaying investment is costly when I < ￿￿
2 . In light of our discussion above, it is
easy to see that under this assumption the two agents are better o⁄ investing immediately
and postponing thinking about the optimal action until after the realization of state ￿2.
Proposition 2: Under assumptions A1, A2 and A4 the equilibrium of the contracting
game involves an immediate o⁄er of either contracts CA;CB or CAB. Either of these contracts
is accepted by agent B. Following the realization of state ￿2 agents think about the optimal
action and the controlling party selects the optimal action once it is identi￿ed.
Proof: Under assumption A4 condition (3) is violated and therefore both agents prefer
to invest at date 0 and think about the optimal action after the realization of ￿2. Thus, an
equilibrium strategy for A is to o⁄er at date 0 either contracts CA;CB or CAB, and to do the
same in future periods should B reject the o⁄er and should the agents remain uninformed.
Otherwise, if the agents learn the optimal action, o⁄er either contracts CR or CS. Party B￿ s
best response to A￿ s strategy is to accept A￿ s o⁄er at date 0. ￿
Under assumption A4, the venture is so pro￿table that the agents agree to a contract
involving immediate investment so as to bring forward the time when they realize the returns
from their investment. As they have congruent underlying preferences they do not care
who has control, so that either control allocation CA;CB or CAB can be an equilibrium
outcome. However we next show that, even when the two agents have congruent underlying
preferences, the indeterminacy over control allocations disappears when the two agents have
di⁄erent preferences over how much thinking to undertake before investing.
3.5 Con￿ icts over cautiousness and the allocation of control rights
We now consider situations in which the two agents disagree on how quickly to act and how
much planning to undertake before investing. This is the case when assumption A5 holds.
13Assumption A5: b ￿￿￿
A < ￿A, b ￿￿￿
B ￿ ￿B and I < ￿￿
2
Under this assumption A is impatient and prefers to invest immediately and to choose
the risky action in state ￿2. Agent B, on the other hand, is more cautious and prefers to
take its time to think through what is the best action in state ￿2. But note also that B is
more intelligent or a faster thinker than A. This is why B wants to think before acting but
not A.
We shall show that the equilibrium outcome of the contracting game between the two
agents under these circumstances may be for the slower but more impatient party to relin-
quish control to the more patient party, paradoxically as a way of accelerating the implemen-
tation of the project. The intuition is that the more patient party may agree to an earlier
implementation of the project if she has control, as control gives her the right to block hasty
future decisions and thus allows her to defer thinking about future decisions to the time
when they arise. As a result she is prepared to commit to the project sooner.


















the equilibrium play is to o⁄er immediately contract CB with probability y￿ and CR with


























When the reverse condition holds, agent A immediately o⁄ers contract CR.
Proof: See the Appendix. ￿
Corollary 1: If the more patient party (agent B) is the proposer then this party optimally
retains full control.
Under condition (4) B prefers to reject contract o⁄ers CR;CS and CA, and to keep
thinking ahead until she determines the optimal action in state ￿2. But A would prefer to
get B to agree to invest immediately. He can only do so if B has some guarantees not to
be forced into a hasty decision in state ￿2. Therefore he grants B some control rights by
o⁄ering either contracts CB or CAB with positive probability.
In other words, the impatient proposer prefers to leave the action choice in state ￿2 open
and give up some control, to get the patient agent to commit to the project sooner and
14refrain from spending too much time ￿ne tuning the details of the deal. By giving up control
A gives B the option to ￿ne tune details later if needed, and thus avoids the opportunity
cost of delaying investment.8 9
Propositions 2 and 3 are among our main results. Each proposition establishes ￿rst
that in a world where complete contracts are fully enforceable, ￿boundedly rational￿agents
optimally choose to write incomplete contracts with control rights over future decisions left
unspeci￿ed in the contract. As in other models of incomplete contracts, Proposition 3 also
establishes that the way control is allocated is in part driven by the agents relative bargaining
strengths. Thus, the proposer tends to appropriate more control other things equal. But,
remarkably, Proposition 3 further establishes that an impatient proposer may choose to give
some control rights to the other more patient party, as a way of accelerating the closure of
contract negotiations.10
There may also be more extreme situations where A has no choice but to wait until B has
determined a complete action-plan. We describe a contracting situation below where party A
is keen to close a deal immediately but B prefers to think ahead, and where equilibrium play is
such that A completely caves in on B￿ s demands and ends up writing an excessively complete
contract (from A￿ s perspective). This situation di⁄ers from the one we have considered in
the following way.













B ￿ ￿B, and
c) I > ￿￿
2
8Note that when Assumption A1 is not satis￿ed we may have situations where:
￿ ￿ RA + (1 ￿ ￿)RA > SA but ￿ ￿ RB + (1 ￿ ￿)RB < SB
That is, the two agents have non-congruent objectives ex ante, even though their underlying preferences are
congruent. In such situations the logic of Proposition 3 still applies.
9In situations where the transfer of control rights may not be legally enforceable, party B can still impose
her preferred action. However, the optimal contract would then specify a complete action-plan ex ante.
Thus, our analysis suggests, paradoxically, that a condition for the emergence of equilibrium incomplete
contracts is that the legal infrastructure is su¢ ciently developed that the enforcement of control rights is
possible.
10Interestingly, this transfer of control would come at the cost of an e¢ ciency loss in the exercise of control
by the patient party if the parties can only engage in cheap talk. As we explain in section 4.2, A might
then always claim that the risky action is optimal no matter what he learns about the true underlying
payo⁄s. There would then be imperfect communication between the parties and therefore learning about
payo⁄s would be slower. Our assumption that the parties can communicate hard information thus plays an
important role here.
15As before, Assumptions A6.b and A6.c ensure that there is no opportunity cost in
thinking ahead and delaying investment for B. At the same time, under Assumption A6.a
A￿ s preferred course of action remains investing immediately. However, although A makes
contract proposals, the bargaining power is e⁄ectively with B, who can credibly reject all
o⁄ers until after underlying payo⁄s are known. In this situation the preferred outcome for A
is to invest immediately and choose action r without thinking, while the worst outcome is to
invest immediately and think after the realization of ￿2. As for B, she prefers to think ahead
to any other alternative. Remarkably, B in this situation fully gets her way even though she
has no bargaining power.
Proposition 4: Under Assumptions A1, A2 and A6 agent A has no choice but to
follow B￿ s preferred path of action, which is to invest only after payo⁄s in state ￿2 has been
uncovered. When this is the case the equilibrium contract is either CR when Rk = Rk or CS
when Rk = Rk.
Proof: See the Appendix.￿
Interestingly, the equilibrium outcome of the contracting game may in some sense be
ine¢ cient, as the agents￿joint welfare may be lower than under A￿ s most preferred course of
action. The reason is that B does not internalize A￿ s opportunity cost of delayed investment
and A is unable to compensate B to get her to accept A￿ s preferred action.
4 Con￿ icting Underlying Objectives
How do con￿ icts over action choice a⁄ect equilibrium contracting? In ￿rst generation mod-
els of incomplete contracting￿ in which contractual incompleteness is exogenously ￿xed￿
allocating control to the right agent is more important the more agents disagree on the
choice of action (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). In our setting instead, greater con￿ icts between
agents are resolved through more complete contracts that generally give less discretion to
the party in control. In other words, control is less relevant when there are greater con￿ icts
between the parties. There are three related reasons why equilibrium contracts leave less
room for discretion.
First, note that control rights may be as much a form of protection to the holder of the
rights as a threat to the non-controlling party. Each party is concerned about potential
16abusive exercise of control by the other party and therefore may prefer to negotiate speci￿c
contractual guarantees rather than give up control.
Second, when the agents have con￿ icting goals they are likely to miscommunicate. That
is, each party will have incentives to suppress information detrimental to itself but bene￿cial
to the other party. As a result, the agents will learn more slowly as a group and the value
of information is reduced. The lower value of information in turn induces the contracting
parties to do less ￿ne-tuning and to write coarser but more complete satis￿cing contracts.
Third, because the holder of control rights may have to accept limits on the exercise of
control (to get the other party to participate) the value of control is reduced. Therefore,
again, agents may prefer to sign a coarse and more complete contract rather than leaving
the choice of actions in some states of nature open to be determined later.
Note ￿nally that the agents are less likely to miscommunicate as long as they have not
signed any contract and are free to walk away from the deal. The reason is simply that
they are then less concerned about disclosing information that might be used against them.
For these reasons, anticipated future con￿ icts introduce a bias towards thinking ahead or no
thinking at all, which leads to more complete satis￿cing contracts.
To focus on the consequences of non-congruent underlying objectives we assume that the
agents always disagree on which action is best under complete information:
Assumption A7: RA < SA < RA and RB > SB > RB:
Although the agents disagree on what to do under complete information we shall for the
most part continue to assume that their ex-ante expected payo⁄s remain aligned. That is,
we shall maintain Assumption A1, which states that both agents prefer the risky action over
the safe action under their common prior beliefs ￿.11
4.1 Miscommunication and the lower value of control
Consider ￿rst the situation where the con￿ ict is so severe that each party is better o⁄
liquidating the venture ex post than have its least preferred action chosen. Moreover, one
party￿ s least preferred action is the other party￿ s most preferred action. Such a situation
arises whenever the following assumption holds:
Assumption A8: RA < 0 and RB < 0.
11Note that assumptions A1 and A7 can only be consistent for interior values of prior beliefs ￿.
17We shall refer to this situation as one where the exercise of control is abusive. The reason
is that Assumptions A7 and A8 together imply that any party in control in state ￿2 takes
an action that produces a negative payo⁄ for the non-controlling party, a worse outcome
than inaction which yields a zero payo⁄.
Recall that when both agents have congruent underlying objectives the net value for
agent k of determining the optimal action choice in state ￿2 (when this choice is left to be




This value can be obtained through the parallel thinking e⁄orts of the two agents combined
with full communication of any information obtained by the two agents.
When there are underlying con￿ icts among the two agents, the value of thinking before
acting in state ￿2 is generally lower, as the agents no longer ￿share all their thoughts￿when
they have con￿ icting goals and stop fully communicating what they have learned.
4.1.1 The Dynamics of Communication and Learning
The non-controlling party is understandably reluctant to disclose information to the control-
ling party that could be used against her. Thus, consider the situation the agents face under
contract CA when they are uninformed in state ￿2.
Suppose ￿rst that B learns Rk = Rk. She then prefers to postpone the time when the
risky action is chosen by A (as she then gets a discounted negative payo⁄RB). She therefore
suppresses this information and reports that she did not learn anything. Hence, A can only
discover this payo⁄ on his own with probability ￿A. Note, however, that if A learns nothing
after one round of thought experimentation (with probability 1￿￿A) and B reports nothing,
A updates his estimate of Pr(Rk = Rk) from his prior (1 ￿ ￿) to
1 ￿ ￿1 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿B) + (1 ￿ ￿)
:
Similarly, after ￿ rounds of experimentation in which A has learned nothing and B has
reported nothing, A￿ s posterior belief that Rk = Rk becomes
1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿B)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
;
which converges to 1. Clearly then, after a su¢ ciently long run of unsuccessful trials it is
optimal for A to stop experimenting and to choose the risky action.
18Agent A￿ s optimal stopping time ￿A and posterior ￿￿A are such that A is indi⁄erent
between taking the risky action immediately or continuing thinking for one more round:
￿￿ARA + (1 ￿ ￿￿A)RA = ￿[￿￿ASA￿ + (1 ￿ ￿￿A)￿ARA+
((￿￿A(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿￿A)(1 ￿ ￿A))(￿￿A+1RA + (1 ￿ ￿￿A+1)RA)]
(we ignore integer constraints for simplicity).
Although B does not disclose anything A still learns something from B￿ s silence. Even
if A cannot tell for sure what the true payo⁄ of the risky action is, when his beliefs have
been updated to the point where he estimates that the risky action yields a payo⁄ RA with
probability ￿￿A, agent A is better o⁄stopping to think further and choosing the risky action.
Suppose next that B learns Rk = Rk. Although B is less reluctant to disclose this
information￿ for then A responds by choosing the safe action with a positive payo⁄ SB for
B￿ she may still choose to withhold that Rk = Rk. The reason is that by withholding this
information she may be able to induce A to choose the risky action (a preferred choice as
RB > SB under Assumption A7). More precisely, when A￿ s beliefs are near ￿￿A (so that A
prefers to stop if he remains uninformed about the optimal action) B is better o⁄withholding
the information that Rk = Rk. But when A￿ s belief ￿ is small, then A prefers to continue
thinking when uninformed, in which case B￿ s best response is to disclose Rk, so as to bring
forward the time when A chooses the safe action.
Thus, the strategic di¢ culty in this situation is that B￿ s best response varies with A￿ s
belief ￿. Moreover, A￿ s best response also depends on B￿ s disclosure policy. When A￿ s belief
is near ￿￿A, A prefers to stop thinking if he expects B to disclose Rk = Rk, but to continue
thinking if he expects B to withhold Rk = Rk.
In short, a pure strategy equilibrium in stopping times and disclosure strategies cannot
exist in this situation. However, as the next lemma establishes, a mixed strategy equilibrium
always exists.
We denote by b ￿ the ￿rst time at which A￿ s beliefs ￿b ￿ are such that A prefers to continue
thinking if B stops disclosing Rk at time b ￿ ￿ 1, but to stop if B only stops disclosing Rk at
time b ￿.
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions A7 and A8, when the agents are uninformed in state ￿2
the only equilibrium under contract contract CA that exists is a mixed strategy equilibrium,
where both A randomizes between stopping and continuing to think and B randomized
between disclosing and stopping to disclose Rk at any time ￿ ￿ b ￿ + 1.
19Proof: See the Appendix. ￿
4.2 Coarse Contracts
As the value of thinking before acting in state ￿2 is lower when there are underlying con￿ icts
among the two agents, the ex-ante value of leaving decisions to be ￿ne-tuned when the state
of nature arises is also lower. The implication, as we show here, is that the two agents may
prefer not to ￿ne-tune their action choice and to write a complete contract with a coarse
action-plan. We refer to such contracts as coarse contracts.
Given that the agents do not cooperate in thinking through the best plan of action in





[￿SA￿(1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿




b ￿(￿b ￿RA + (1 ￿ ￿b ￿)RA):
(note that since A is indi⁄erent between stopping or continuing thinking at b ￿ his payo⁄ at
b ￿ is given by ￿b ￿RA + (1 ￿ ￿b ￿)RA).
The main di¢ culty in our analysis here is the characterization of the ￿rst stopping time
b ￿. However, for some parameter values we can establish that A prefers to stop thinking right
away ￿ so that b ￿ = 0￿ even if thinking is optimal if the agents cooperate. This is so if:
￿A ￿ (￿SA￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)RA￿A) + ￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿A)]￿A;
which can rewritten as:
￿A ￿
￿SA￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)RA￿A
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ (￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿A))
: (5)
To side-step the di¢ culty of characterizing the optimal ￿rst stopping time b ￿ in general, we
restrict attention to parameter values for which b ￿ = 0. Thus, we assume henceforth,




(￿SA￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)RA￿A) + ￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿A)]￿A <
￿(￿SA + (1 ￿ ￿)RA) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿A;
there are situations under assumption A8 where both b ￿￿￿
A > ￿A and condition (5) hold.
20Recall that when assumption A4 holds (that is b ￿￿￿
k > ￿k and I < ￿￿
2 ) and when the
agents have congruent underlying preferences, then satis￿cing contracts are incomplete and
assign control to one or both agents (Proposition 2). In contrast, as we show below, when the
agents have non-congruent preferences they will sign a complete but coarse contract under
the same circumstances.
We have already established that under Assumption A9, A cannot do better under
contract CA than under contract CR. Similarly, when the agents sign contract CAB in this
situation, the best they can do is not to think and instead immediately choose the risky
action in state ￿2. The value of thinking is even lower than under contract CA, as a complete
stalemate arises once the agents know the true payo⁄Rk and learn that they fundamentally
disagree on the action choice. Therefore an additional reason why the risky action is chosen
when the agents do not know the true payo⁄ Rk is that each party knows that by engaging
in thought experimentation they run the risk of a stalemate.
Proposition 5: Under Assumptions A1, A4, A7, A8 and A9 agent A (weakly)
prefers the coarse contract CR at date 0 to contracts CA, CB or CAB, and therefore there is
no equilibrium in which an incomplete contract is proposed and accepted.
Proof: See the Appendix. ￿
Under the assumptions of Proposition 5, incomplete contracts cannot be equilibrium
contracts. This is entirely due to the agents￿extremely non-congruent objectives. As we
have shown in the previous section, if the agents had congruent preferences then under
Assumption A4 they would prefer to sign an incomplete contract. Here, the agents prefer
to commit to a coarse action-plan rather than leave things to be ￿ne-tuned later, as they
anticipate that they will face ex-post miscommunication ine¢ ciencies. Miscommunication,
in turn, reduces the value of thinking and ￿ne-tuning ex post to the point that the agents
prefer not to think and instead to stick to a coarse action plan.
Note that, although incomplete contracts are (weakly) dominated here, it is not obvious
whether a complete coarse contract or a complete state-contingent contract is optimal. More
precisely, it is not clear whether the agents will immediately sign contract CR or whether
they will think ￿rst and then sign a complete state-contingent contract. Indeed, despite their
non-congruent objectives the agents may prefer to put their di⁄erences aside and collaborate
in working out a state-contingent action-plan before committing to invest.
21Agent B prefers the coarse contract CR, since under a state-contingent action-plan A
imposes the risky action when it is detrimental to B and the safe action when B stands to




















Agent A also prefers the coarse contract CR if the opportunity cost of delaying investment
(￿￿
2 ￿ I) is high, and otherwise prefers to think before investing.
Suppose that B￿ s participation constraint does not bind:




As we have established in the previous section, under Assumptions A4 and A10, agents
with congruent preferences agree on the incomplete contract CA. In contrast, here, with ex-
treme non-congruent preferences such that Assumption A8 holds, either the coarse contract
CR is signed at date 0, or both agents think ahead before signing a contract.
Proposition 6: Under Assumptions A1, A4, A7, A8, A9 and A10, a cuto⁄ I < ￿￿
2
exists such that in equilibrium agents think ahead before committing to invest in the venture
if I ￿ I. Otherwise, A and B sign the coarse contract CR at date 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.￿
The agents prefer to agree on a complete contract, because their con￿ icting objectives
undermine future cooperation and, thus, reduce the bene￿ts of postponing some decisions.
At the same time, the allocation of control rights is too blunt an instrument, since the
controlling party can exploit the non-controlling party.
Note ￿nally that when Assumption A9 does not hold a complete contract can still emerge
(provided I is large enough) even though the agents would have chosen an incomplete con-
tract had their objectives been congruent.
4.3 The need to compromise reduces the value of planning ahead
In this section, we consider a situation where the agents are best o⁄ thinking ahead of
investing. We show that there will be no miscommunication in equilibrium as long as the
agents are not committed to the venture. Nevertheless, the need to compromise to make
22the venture acceptable to both agents may reduce the value of information su¢ ciently that
the agents end up preferring a coarse, complete contract to a complete state-contingent
contract. Similarly, the need to reduce discretion of the controlling party may reduce the
value of control su¢ ciently that the agents prefer a coarse complete contract.
Under Assumption A3 (b ￿￿￿
k > ￿k and I > ￿￿
2 ) each agent would prefer to think before
choosing an action, provided it could choose its preferred action and agents share their
thoughts. In addition, since I > ￿￿
2 , each agent would prefer this thinking to take place ahead
of investing. Under con￿ icting preferences, however, agents cannot both implement their
preferred action. Only the controlling party may be able to do so. Even though Assumption
A3 holds, the non-controlling party may well prefer not to engage in any planning. To
get the non-controlling party to accept a contract where it has no control, the controlling
party may then need to constrain its own discretion. But as we show below, while limiting
its discretion the controlling party may in turn prefer not to engage in any planning and
instead sign a complete but coarse contract.
To illustrate this observation we assume that the con￿ ict among the agents is so severe
that, if the agents think ahead of investing and learn that Rk = Rk, B prefers to stay out of
the venture rather than agreeing to A￿ s preferred action:
Assumption A11: ￿I + ￿￿
2 + ￿
2RB < 0:
Here, to get B to participate A must commit not to implement the risky action in state








￿RB + (1 ￿ x
￿)SB) = 0: (6)
Note that, unlike in the situation when the parties have already made their investments
and are uninformed in state ￿2, there will be no miscommunication when the agents think
before they commit to the venture. The reason is that the worst outcome for either party
before investment takes place is to obtain a payo⁄of zero by walking away from the venture.
Therefore, a (weak) best response for B is to always disclose Rk. And given that B always
discloses Rk, it is also a best response to always disclose Rk. The reason is that if B does
not disclose Rk, A only stops learning when his beliefs ￿￿ are su¢ ciently close to 1, in which
case he chooses the safe action. But then B is only delaying the time when she obtains SB
by not disclosing Rk.
Still, even though agents share their thoughts, the value of information may be su¢ ciently
reduced for A (when he needs to compromise), that he prefers to immediately settle on the
23risky action without thinking. If A ends up choosing the safe action most of the time￿
whenever Rk = Rk, and with probability (1 ￿ x￿) when Rk = Rk￿ what is the point of
engaging in time-consuming thinking?
Another di¢ culty here is that after one period of thinking the agents bargain under
incomplete information. Thus, if A makes an o⁄er CR in any period t ￿ 1, B may suspect
that A actually knows that Rk = Rk.
Proposition 7: Under Assumptions A1, A3, A7, A8, A9 and A11, an o⁄er CR








￿ ￿ ￿ SB)
is close enough to zero.
Proof: See the Appendix. ￿
When agents attempt to write down a detailed plan of action, they also learn that they
have fundamental di⁄erences. The need to compromise then reduces the value of information
and will result in less ￿ne-tuned contracts. A coarse contract is also a compromise but one
where the cost of thinking is avoided. Here a deal is quickly concluded because this is an
e¢ cient resolution of the agents con￿ icting objectives, avoiding lengthy and ultimately sterile
negotiations.
4.4 Preliminary contracts
So far we have restricted attention to ￿ve main contracts. But there is also a sixth contract,
which we refer to as a preliminary contract which can be an equilibrium contract. Under
this contract, which we denote by C￿, the agents agree to ￿rst think ahead of investing and
are committed to an action contingent on Rk.
This contract may be preferred to the coarse contract CR because it yields higher expected
payo⁄s by committing the agents to participate even when an agent￿ s ex-post participation
constraint does not hold. More precisely, the preliminary contract can secure B￿ s participa-





￿ (xSB + (1 ￿ x)RB)
2
￿ 0.
A preliminary contract can then raise A￿ s value from thinking ahead while guaranteeing
B￿ s participation. However, to be acceptable to B the preliminary contract must guarantee
24B a su¢ ciently high expected payo⁄in state ￿2 even though A gets to choose the risky action
with a higher probability than x￿.
To illustrate this possibility while keeping the analysis simple we shall consider the special
situation where B is unable to think, so that ￿B = 0.13
Consider the following preliminary contract C￿ o⁄ered by A to B at t = 0:
a) the agents commit to invest once they have discovered the value of Rk;
b) if Rk = Rk, action r is chosen in state ￿2;
c) if Rk = Rk, action s is chosen with probability ￿ and action r with probability (1￿￿)
in state ￿2, where ￿ solves agent B￿ s participation constraint at date 0.
We shall show that this contract may be strictly preferred by A to CR and that B accepts








￿ ￿ ￿ SB)
is close to 1. Indeed, when x￿ is close to 1 the agents prefer to think ahead and settle on either
contract CS or Cx￿ rather than immediately agree on CR. But we shall show that in this
case the agents can do even better by signing a preliminary contract under two additional
assumptions.
This preliminary contract, o⁄ered before the agents have thought through their action in
state ￿2, allows them to e⁄ectively transfer payo⁄s across states of nature and thus achieve a
higher ex-ante expected payo⁄, as with an insurance contract. Although they are both risk
neutral, there are gains from such an agreement by letting the agents trade commitments
to choosing the risky action in situations when it is not their most preferred action. In this
way the agents can make ex-post non-transferable utilities partially transferable ex ante.
The role of a preliminary contract is, thus, to overcome a form of Hirshleifer e⁄ect, where
information eliminates insurance or trading opportunities and thus results in a decline in ex-
ante utility. Here, as the agents￿information changes over time, so does the intensity of the
con￿ icts that oppose them. Absent a preliminary contract, B will be unwilling to invest
when it expects to get RB in state ￿2: Under the veil-of-ignorance concerning agents￿true
payo⁄s, they are able to ￿nd room for agreements they would not be able to reach once the
information is revealed.
13When ￿B > 0 agent B￿ s thinking also contributes to the contracting parties aggregate learning capacity.
In this situation the analysis is more complex as B has incentives not to share her thoughts. The preliminary
contract must then generally also specify a stopping time when the parties are committed to invest.








Assumption A13: ￿I + ￿￿
2 + ￿
2RA > 0:
Then we are then able to establish:
Proposition 8: Under the same Assumptions as in Proposition 7 and Assumptions A12








￿ ￿ ￿ SB)
is su¢ ciently close to 1, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is such that:
i) A o⁄ers a preliminary contract to B at t = 0 with the following terms: a) the
agents commit to invest once they have thought through Rk; b) if Rk = Rk then action r is
chosen in state ￿2; c) if Rk = Rk then action s is chosen with probability ￿ and action r







[￿(￿SB + (1 ￿ ￿)RB) + (1 ￿ ￿)RB)] = 0 (7)
ii) both agents think ahead and share their thoughts.
Proof: See the Appendix. ￿
Under Assumption A12, A strictly prefers the preliminary contract to thinking ahead
and settling on either contracts CS or Cx￿. Moreover, under assumption A3 both agents
prefer the preliminary contract to CR given that x￿ is close to 1. Finally, under the contract
both agents prefer to think and share their thoughts, as no investment can take place unless
they discover value of Rk.
5 Extensions
This section explores two extensions to our basic setup.
265.1 Cheap talk
We have assumed that agents￿thoughts are hard information. This may be realistic in some
situations (e.g. a mathematical proof) but less so in others. Here we examine the opposite
case in which thoughts are soft information so that communication is pure cheap talk. Most
of our qualitative results extend to this case.
With cheap talk there is inevitably more miscommunication than with disclosure of hard
information. First, when agents disagree about how cautiously to proceed there is now
some miscommunication. Second, under extreme non-congruent preferences over actions
miscommunication is now total, while before it was only partial.
Under congruent objectives, however, agents trust each others￿ s reports and communica-
tion is unimpaired. A result similar to Lemma 1, with the addition of Assumption A3, can
be established, and Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold.
Thus, consider ￿rst the situation where the agents may disagree on how cautiously to
proceed. We show below that even though cheap talk allows for miscommunication, a result
analogous to Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 obtains under slightly di⁄erent conditions.
The problem under cheap talk is that the more patient agent can no longer trust the
more impatient one to tell the truth. Since the impatient agent prefers to choose the risky
action without thinking further, it will always pretend that it has found that the risky action
has a payo⁄ Rk when it has not discovered anything. The impatient agent is thus credible
only when reporting Rk = Rk.
Suppose again that A is impatient and prefers the risky action in state ￿2 without thinking
further, while B prefers to think before acting. Miscommunication then has two opposing
e⁄ects. On the one hand, B￿ s threat to reject all o⁄ers until she has thought through Rk is
less credible, because miscommunication slows down the agents￿joint thinking, thus reducing
the value of thinking ahead. On the other hand, the value of control for B is reduced for the
same reason. On net, although B is more likely to accept a contract without control rights,
when she does require control to sign on, she demands more control than when thoughts are
hard information.
More formally, assume that beginning at date t = 0, A makes repeated o⁄ers of CR,
which B rejects to gain time to think about Rk. Following each rejection both agents think
and engage in cheap talk. As we have observed, A reports Rk both when this is the true
payo⁄ and when he learns nothing, and he truthfully reports Rk. As for B, she truthfully
shares her thoughts.
27Therefore, when A reports Rk, B believes this is true and accepts A￿ s o⁄er CS. In
contrast, when A reports Rk, B only updates her belief ￿t. After t rounds of communication
of Rk, her posterior belief is:
￿t =
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿A)t:
Thus, B￿ s beliefs ￿t converge to 1. In other words, it dawns on B that A has learned
that Rk = Rk. Following a su¢ ciently long sequence of announcements of Rk, B therefore
￿nds it optimal to stop rejecting A￿ s o⁄ers of CR. At her optimal stopping time, denoted by
tB, B is indi⁄erent between accepting CR and and thinking for one more period. That is,
her posterior ￿tB is such that:
￿tBRB + (1 ￿ ￿tB)RB = ￿[￿tB￿BRB + (1 ￿ ￿tB)SB￿+
((￿tB(1 ￿ ￿B) + (1 ￿ ￿tB)(1 ￿ ￿))(￿tB+1RB + (1 ￿ ￿tB+1)RB)]:
Although con￿ icts over cautiousness may be reduced if miscommunication slows down
thinking, they do not disappear. Formally, Assumption A5 must be replaced by Assumption
A5b below to re￿ ect the change in expected discounted payo⁄s resulting from miscommu-
nication. Denoting agent k￿ s payo⁄ (k = A;B) when both agents think before choosing the





[￿Rk￿B(1 + (1 ￿ ￿B)
t￿




tB(￿tBRk + (1 ￿ ￿tB)Rk);
then Assumption A5b is as follows:
Assumption A5b: W A < ￿A, W B ￿ ￿B and I < ￿￿
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￿(￿tBRB + (1 ￿ ￿tB)RB)
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];
28then we are able to establish the following analog of Proposition 3 for the contracting game
with cheap talk.









in equilibrium A o⁄ers immediately CB with probability y￿ and CR with probability (1￿y￿),












When the reverse condition holds, A immediately o⁄ers contract CR.
Proof: Omitted.￿
Similarly, a result analogous to Proposition 4, which we omit, can be established under
modi￿ed conditions to re￿ ect miscommunication.
Now consider situations where the two agents disagree about the choice of action (As-
sumption A7 holds). In this case, communication breaks down completely, as each agent
has a strict incentive to mislead the other. As a result, the two agents think by themselves
and duplicate their cognitive e⁄orts. Results analogous to Propositions 5, 6 and 7 obtain
again under modi￿ed conditions to account for the slower thinking. The key di⁄erence with
the previous analysis is that the parameter region for which equilibrium contracts are coarse
is larger.
Lemma 3: When the equilibrium contract under hard information is a coarse contract,
it is also the equilibrium contract when information is soft.
Proof: The agents￿payo⁄s under a coarse contract are the same whether information
is hard or soft. Indeed, no thinking is involved. Moreover, any other contract o⁄er that
involves some thinking cannot result in a higher payo⁄ for A under soft information than
under hard information. It therefore follows that if CR is an equilibrium o⁄er at t = 0 when
information is hard it must also be an equilibrium o⁄er when information is soft. ￿
Finally, another di⁄erence with the case with hard information is that negotiations may
last forever even when A has thought through Rk. Indeed, by repeating over and over again
the same information, A is unable to persuade B that his information is reliable. Since B￿ s
beliefs do not change, A does not have a ￿nite stopping time. This, in turn, reduces the
value of a preliminary contract.
295.2 Transferable utility
We assume now that utility is fully transferable through (state-contingent) monetary pay-
ments. In this case, a preliminary contract has even greater bene￿ts. Indeed, by ￿rst speci-
fying the broad terms of the deal, such a contract aligns the agents￿objectives, leading them
to agree on how much thinking should precede investment. Hence, they will more readily
accept to invest without having worked out a complete action-plan.
Lemma 4 (The Congruence Principle): It is weakly optimal for the agents to sign a
preliminary contract establishing how the agents will share the pro￿ts.
Proof: See the Appendix.￿
Once the agents have agreed on pro￿t-sharing, their objectives are fully congruent, and
communication is perfect whether thoughts are hard or soft information. Therefore, the
contracting problem reduces to determining the team￿ s optimal plan of action. Any actions
that the contracting agents determine by thinking ahead will be speci￿ed in the contract
and any decisions to be determined at the time when they arise will be taken jointly by the
two agents.
Strictly speaking, there is no need for contracts beyond the preliminary agreement. Note,
however, that under even a very small risk of change in one of the agents￿preferences resulting
in a con￿ ict ex-post, the agents would strictly prefer to explicitly spell out what future action
choices they have agreed to in a contract. For the same reason the agents would strictly
prefer to specify a governance structure that de￿nes the process by which future decisions
are taken.
With only one state of nature (￿2) where some thinking is needed, the contracting problem
with transferable utility collapses to a simple decision problem of the type studied in Bolton
and Faure-Grimaud (2008). When thinking is required in more than one state of nature
(e.g. in state ￿1) the team problem is of independent interest as it raises a number of
organizational design questions. For instance, an interesting set of questions is who in the
team should think about what problem? Is the team more e¢ cient when both agents think
about the same problem at the same time, or rather when they specialize and engage in
parallel thinking? The analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper and is left
for future research.
306 Conclusion
We have proposed and explored a ￿rst contracting model between two agents facing time-
deliberation costs. In this model, equilibrium contracts may be endogenously incomplete.
Control rights assigned to one of the parties allow the controlling agent to defer time-
consuming deliberations to a later date without exposing her to too much uncertainty. As
she will be in charge of the decisions most critical to her, she need to worry too much and
unduly prolong negotiations at the initial contracting stage.
However, when agents face potentially major con￿ icts they tend to resolve these up-front,
by writing more complete initial contracts. This more complete contract may be either a
more state-contingent or a coarser contract. Thus con￿ icts among contracting agents tend
to result in excessively complete contracts from the perspective of joint payo⁄maximization.
Equilibrium contracts in our model are incomplete for two reasons: ￿rst, the costs of
thinking about how to complete them may exceed the expected bene￿ts; and second, the
costs of thinking about how to outwit the other agent also exceed the expected bene￿ts.
In contrast to ￿rst generation incomplete contracting models, contracts are not incomplete
due to exogenously given enforcement constraints. Indeed, we have assumed that all state-
contingent transactions are fully enforceable. Instead, contractual incompleteness is due to
the limited imagination of the contracting agents.
We believe that this set-up lends itself naturally to the analysis of contractual innovation.
Over time new contracting agents can learn from past contracts and may innovate relative
to existing contracts, even if the legal environment remains unchanged. Also, in our setup
the law has other roles than just an enforcement role, and contract law does not simply
reduce to the enforcement of a freedom of contracting regime. Courts and trade associations
can add value by specifying default rules or contracts, which e⁄ectively reduce transaction
costs for new contracting agents. Indeed, Chakraborty and MacLeod (2008) argue that the
American Institute of Architects standard form contracts for construction projects, which
have evolved over a long period of time, indeed provide an e¢ cient default contract for
complex construction projects that is readily available to any contracting parties in the
construction business. They also show that a central feature of these contracts is the inclusion
of control rights and governance structures that determine the ex post bargaining power of
parties.
Similarly, by putting constraints on the exercise of control rights, courts can reduce the
risk of abusive control and thereby allow contracting agents to sign more e¢ cient incomplete
31contracts. In the absence of such constraints the equilibrium outcome of the contracting
game may be that both parties end up wasting a lot of time ￿ne-tuning the contract before
investing, while with legal limits on the exercise of control the parties may end up agreeing
on an incomplete contract much more quickly. A fuller exploration of these implications and
ideas are left for future research.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3: We ￿rst establish a series of preliminary results that simplify
the argument.
Claim 1: Let URFI
min be the lowest payo⁄ that the receiver can guarantee herself in any sub-
game under complete information. Then, either the proposer implements her most preferred
contract or the receiver gets exactly URFI
min .
Proof: Observe ￿rst that URFI
min = 0 in the absence of a pre-existing contractual agree-
ment. Suppose now that the claim is not true and that there exists an SPNE where under
full information, the receiver gets some payo⁄ b U > URFI
min , and the proposer is not o⁄ering
his most preferred plan of action. For this to be true, it must be that the receiver rejects
any o⁄er that gives her less than b U. But, given that the proposer is not making his most
preferred o⁄er, it must then be the case that the receiver is just indi⁄erent between accept-
ing and rejecting the o⁄er giving her b U. Otherwise, the receiver could o⁄er a lottery that
would put some weight " on his most preferred contract and (1 ￿ ") on the o⁄er currently
providing b U to the receiver. Therefore it must be that along the equilibrium path in such
an equilibrium, at any date t; b Ut = ￿b Ut+1. Iteration of this argument requires b Ut+￿ to go to
in￿nity as ￿ goes to in￿nity, which is impossible.￿
Claim 2: Denote by URFI the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payo⁄ that the receiver
obtains in any subgame under complete information. Then, in any subgame where the payo⁄s
34of the risky action are unknown, either the proposer o⁄ers her most preferred contract, or
the receiver gets UR
min = b ￿URFI.
Proof: Suppose again this is not true. As in the proof of Claim 1, it then follows that
the receiver must be indi⁄erent at any date t between accepting or rejecting the o⁄er that
gives the receiver some utility level e UR
t > UR




RFI + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e U
R
t+1.
And, if e UR
t = e UR
t+1; then e UR
t = ￿
1￿(1￿￿)￿URFI = b ￿URFI; a contradiction. Alternatively,







￿ ￿ b ￿U




which, when e UR
t > UR
min requires e UR
t+￿ to go to in￿nity when ￿ goes to in￿nity. Again, this
leads to a contradiction.￿
We now make use of these observations to establish Proposition 3.
Note ￿rst that under assumptions A2 and A4 party B￿ s minimum guaranteed payo⁄ is
U
B




























then the proposer￿ s most preferred contract￿CR ￿ gives a higher expected payo⁄ to B than
UB
min. Therefore B￿ s best response is to accept this o⁄er.
Now suppose that condition (4) holds. Then, from claim 1, the receiver gets exactly UB
min
in equilibrium.
To complete the proof of proposition 3 it remains to show that the stochastic contract
o⁄er that gives A the highest possible payo⁄ while guaranteeing UB
min to B, takes the form
described in the proposition, namely that both agents agree to invest immediately, party B
gets control with probability y￿ and the risky action is chosen in state ￿2 with probability
(1 ￿ y￿).
There are several types of stochastic contracts that can implement UB
min. A ￿rst contract
is to give full control to party B (draw contract CB) with probability y and to take the
35risky action in state ￿2 with probability (1￿y).14 An alternative o⁄er is to give B control in
every period with some probability z and to take the risky action in state ￿2 with probability
(1 ￿ z). As we show below these two contracts are in fact equivalent. To see this, note that
under the latter contract party k expects to receive:
(1 ￿ z)￿k + z￿￿
￿
k+
z(1 ￿ ￿)￿ [z(1 ￿ ￿)￿ [(1 ￿ z)￿k + z￿￿
￿
k + z(1 ￿ ￿)￿[:::]] =
z￿














k + (1 ￿ y)￿k:
(Note also that there is no loss of generality in considering only stationary strategies zt = z
for all t).
We now characterise the highest payo⁄ available to A under the constraint that B gets
UB
min. Agent A￿ s control variables are the probability x of engaging in thinking ahead before
investing and the probability y of engaging in thinking on the spot in state ￿2 before chosing



































































Other contracts that involve for instance choosing the safe action before learning whether
it is optimal or, choosing the sub-optimal action once agents have learned which action is
best are dominated for both agents and cannot therefore maximize A￿ s payo⁄ under the
constraint that B obtains at least UB
min.
14An equivalent contract is to draw contract C￿ with probability y and to take the risky action in state
￿2 with probability (1 ￿ y):




(1 ￿ x) = (1 ￿ y)
@L
@y






@y) is the partial derivative of the Lagrange function with respect to x (resp.
y) and # is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint.
From the last inequality it is apparent that the solution to this program is x￿ = 0 and





















which is true under assumptions A2 to A4. This establishes that the most e¢ cient way for
A to deviate from his preferred course of action is to invest right away, to choose the risky
action in state ￿2 with probability (1 ￿ y￿) and to think on the spot with probability y￿.
This action-plan is implemented by o⁄ering party B control with probability y￿, as party B


























To summarize, the following strategies support this subgame-perfect equilibrium:
- Equilibrium strategy for A : at date 0, o⁄er a stochastic contract committing
to immediate investment and that implements CR with probability 1 ￿ y￿ and CB with
probability y￿. If the contract is accepted, invest at date 0 and if state ￿2 is realized and
A has control, implement decision r. If B has control, think and credibly reveal any new
information to B.
If the o⁄er is rejected, think and again credibly reveal any new information to B. If
A uncovers the optimal decision in state ￿2 reveal it to B and o⁄er the ￿rst-best optimal
complete contract to B (either CR or CS depending on whether A uncovers that r or s is
optimal). Similarly, if B reveals the optimal decision in state ￿2 o⁄er the ￿rst-best complete
contract to B.
If A learns nothing during that second sub-period of period 0 (from his own thinking
or from B) repeat at date 1 the same strategy as at date 0 and continue doing so until
investment takes place.15
15Note that nothing is changed if party A o⁄ers initially CA instead of Cr; or C￿ instead of CB.
37- Equilibrium strategy for B : at date 0, accept all contract o⁄ers with immediate
investment that take support in CnfCSg, provided that those o⁄ers put a weight of at least
y￿ on the choice of CB. In state ￿2, when B has control think on the spot and implement
the optimal decision. Following a rejection at date 0, think in the second sub-period of
date 0 and reveal any information to A. Then accept all ￿rst-best complete contract o⁄ers.
Similarly, if A reveals that decision s (resp. r) is optimal in state ￿2, accept all ￿rst-best
complete contract o⁄ers. If neither party learns anything, repeat at date 1 the same strategy
as at date 0 and continue doing so until a contract is accepted.￿
Proof of Corollary 1: immediate from previous results and noticing that now neces-





















Therefore, the proposer B must obtain her most preferred path of action, i.e. CB:
Proof of Proposition 4: Note that under assumption A6.b and A6.c, UB
min = b ￿URFI
is the highest attainable payo⁄ for B. From claim 2 above, this must be her equilibrium
payo⁄. Also, under assumption A6.a thinking ahead of investing is costly for A and is not
his most preferred strategy.￿
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions A7 and A8, when the agents are uninformed in state ￿2
under contract contract CA the only equilibrium that exists is a mixed strategy equilibrium,
where both A and B randomize between stopping and not stopping at any time ￿ ￿ b ￿ + 1.
Proof of Lemma 2: We begin by showing that a pure strategy equilibrium cannot
exist. To see this, note that withholding all information (whether Rk = Rk or Rk = Rk)
from time ￿ onwards is a best response for B whenever:
[￿(1 ￿ ￿A)]
(￿A￿￿)RB ￿ SB(1 ￿
(￿A￿￿) X
t=1
(￿A(1 + (1 ￿ ￿A)
t￿
t)), (8)
where we de￿ne A￿ s stopping time ￿A under the assumption that B always discloses Rk
up to time ￿A.
But if B stops disclosing Rk at some earlier time ￿, A￿ s optimal stopping time in turn may
change, as A can then no longer update his beliefs after time ￿. Let ￿B and ￿￿B respectively
38denote the time when B stops disclosing Rk and A￿ s belief at time ￿B. Also, let
b ￿A =
￿A
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿A)￿
;
then we have either:
￿￿BRA + (1 ￿ ￿￿B)RA ￿ b ￿A(￿￿BSA + (1 ￿ ￿￿B)RA); (9)
or
￿￿BRA + (1 ￿ ￿￿B)RA < b ￿A(￿￿BSA + (1 ￿ ￿￿B)RA). (10)
That is, it is best for A to either stop thinking at time ￿B, or to continue thinking until he
learns the optimal action.
In the latter situation we have ￿A 7￿! 1 so that (8) no longer holds and B￿ s best response
is to disclose Rk at time ￿B. Similarly, in the former situation, we have ￿A = ￿B, but if this
is anticipated B￿ s best response is to stop disclosing Rk even earlier. In sum, whether (10)
holds or not, a pure strategy equilibrium in stopping times does not exist.
There exists a mixed strategy equilibrium, as we now establish, where both A and B
randomize between stopping and not stopping at any time ￿ ￿ b ￿ + 1. Time b ￿ is the ￿rst
time when ￿b ￿ is such that
￿b ￿￿1RA + (1 ￿ ￿b ￿￿1)RA < b ￿A(￿b ￿￿1SA + (1 ￿ ￿b ￿￿1)RA)
but
￿b ￿RA + (1 ￿ ￿b ￿)RA ￿ b ￿A(￿b ￿SA + (1 ￿ ￿b ￿)RA):
If we denote by ￿ the probability that A stops thinking at any time ￿ ￿ b ￿ and by ’￿￿1
the probability that B stops disclosing Rk at ￿ ￿1 then for any ￿ the following two equations
must hold in equilibrium. For A we must have:
￿
A(￿￿￿1) = ￿f￿￿￿1SA(’￿￿1￿A + (1 ￿ ’￿￿1)￿) + (1 ￿ ￿￿￿1)￿ARA +




A(￿￿) = ￿￿RA + (1 ￿ ￿￿)RA;
and
1 ￿ ￿￿ = ’￿￿1(1 ￿ ￿￿) +
(1 ￿ ’￿￿1)(1 ￿ ￿￿￿1)
￿￿￿1(1 ￿ ￿B) + (1 ￿ ￿￿￿1)
:
39Similarly, for party B we must have:






In other words, for any ￿, B must be indi⁄erent between stopping disclosing Rk at ￿ + 1 or
at ￿. If B stops at ￿ + 1 (and therefore discloses Rk in period ￿) she gets SB at ￿. If she
does not disclose Rk at ￿, then A discovers Rk at ￿ with probability ￿A, in which case B
gets again SB. With probability (1￿￿A), A does not discover Rk and stops with probability
￿, in which case B gets RB; and ￿nally with probability (1￿￿) party A continues learning,
in which case B￿ s continuation value is ￿SB (as B discloses Rk at ￿ + 1).
As can be readily checked, these equations admit a unique solution ￿ 2 [0;1] and ’￿￿1 2
[0;1] under Assumptions A7 and A8. ￿
Proposition 5: Under Assumptions A1, A4, A7, A8 and A9 agent A (weakly)
prefers the coarse contract CR at date 0 to contracts CA, CB or CAB, and therefore there is
an equilibrium in which no incomplete contract is proposed and accepted.
Proof of Proposition 5: Under assumption A8 and A9 CR is (weakly) preferred by
both agents to CA. In addition under assumptions A1 and A7, CR is also preferred by A to
CS which is again preferred by A to CB as SA > V A
B , where V A







[￿RA￿B(1 + (1 ￿ ￿B)
￿￿




￿B(￿￿BRA + (1 ￿ ￿￿B)RA);
and where ￿B is similarly de￿ned as b ￿ but with A￿ s and B￿ s roles interchanged.
Also, CR is (weakly) preferred by both agents to CAB. Finally, by Claim 2 in the Appen-
dix, CB will not be o⁄ered in equilibrium even when B prefers CB to CR. ￿
Proposition 6: Under Assumptions A1, A4, A7, A8, A9 and A10, a cuto⁄ I < ￿￿
2
exists such in equilibrium: If I ￿ I agents think ahead before commiting to invest in the
venture; Otherwise, A and B sign the coarse contract CR at date 0.
40Proof of Proposition 6: The cuto⁄I is de￿ned by equating A￿ s expected payo⁄s under

































To see that an o⁄er of CR at date 0￿ which is accepted by B￿ is an equilibrium when
I < I, note ￿rst that under Assumptions A7, A8 and A9, an o⁄er of CR at date 0 provides
a higher payo⁄ than CA, CB or CAB to both A and B (as established in Proposition 5).
Moreover, when I ￿ I, both agents are also better o⁄ signing CR at date 0 than thinking
ahead. Therefore, B will accept an o⁄er of CR at date 0 and A will indeed o⁄er CR.
Finally, when I 2 [I; ￿￿
2 ), A is better o⁄ delaying a contract o⁄er and thinking ahead if
B also thinks and shares her thoughts. Similarly, B￿ s best response to A thinking ahead is
to also think ahead and share her thoughts. ￿
Proposition 7: Under Assumptions A1, A3, A7, A8, A9 and A11, an o⁄er CR








￿ ￿ ￿ SB)
is close enough to zero.
Proof of Proposition 7: Given their prior beliefs both agents prefer the risky to the
safe action under assumption A1. Agent A can make an o⁄er CR at t = 0 and have B accept
it when it is common knowledge that none of the players are informed.
We shall assume that B has pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs and that if a contract
is not immediately accepted at time t = 0, B believes that A knows that Rk = Rk when
he makes an o⁄er CR and therefore B rejects any o⁄er CR past period 0 given Assumption
A11.
Thus after t = 0, A can no longer get an o⁄er CR accepted by B. Under Assumption
A11, the only o⁄ers B will accept after time t = 0 are CS and contract Cx￿, where r is
41chosen with probability x￿ de￿ned in equation (6) and s is chosen with probability (1 ￿ x￿)







(￿SA + (1 ￿ ￿)(x
￿RA + (1 ￿ x
￿)SA))]







(￿RA + (1 ￿ ￿)RA);
when x￿ is low enough, by Assumption A1.
Moreover, under Assumption A8 and A9 A weakly prefers contract CR to CA. ￿
Proposition 8: Under the same Assumptions as in Proposition 7 and Assumptions A12








￿ ￿ ￿ SB)
is su¢ ciently close to 1, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is such that:
i) A o⁄ers a preliminary contract to B at t = 0 with the following terms: a) the
agents commit to invest once they have thought through Rk; b) if Rk = Rk then action r is
chosen in state ￿2; c) if Rk = Rk then action s is chosen with probability ￿ and action r







[￿(￿SB + (1 ￿ ￿)RB) + (1 ￿ ￿)RB)] = 0 (11)
ii) both agents think ahead and share their thoughts.
Proof of Proposition 8: Note ￿rst that if (11) holds the preliminary contract is
acceptable to B. Second, under Assumption A12, A strictly prefers the preliminary contract
to thinking ahead and settling on either contracts CS or Cx￿. To see this, consider, A￿ s ex-








[￿(￿SA + (1 ￿ ￿)RA) +








[￿(￿SB + (1 ￿ ￿)RB) +
(1 ￿ ￿)(xRB + (1 ￿ x)SB)] = 0
42Substituting for x, this problem is equivalent to the unconstrained problem:
max
￿ ￿(￿(SA ￿ RA) + RA) + (1 ￿ ￿)SA +
(RA ￿ SA)[
2I
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)SB ￿ ￿(￿(SB ￿ RB) + RB)
RB ￿ SB
]
Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿ we observe that the coe¢ cient with respect to ￿ is strictly
positive under Assumption A12, which means that A would like to set ￿ as high as possible
and x as low as possible. The best contract for A is then obtained by setting x = 0.
Third, A and B prefer the preliminary contract to CR under Assumption A3 given that
x￿ is close to 1, as they then already prefer to think ahead and settle on contracts CS and
Cx￿ to signing CR.
Fourth, A￿ s continuation best-response following acceptance of contract C￿ is to think
ahead, for no investment can take place unless A reveals the value of Rk.
Fifth, A is clearly better o⁄ disclosing Rk under Assumptions A1 and A7. He is also
better o⁄ disclosing Rk under Assumption A13.
Finally, under Assumptions A8 and A9 the agents weakly prefer CR to CA, but CR in
turn is dominated by C￿ when x￿ is close to 1. ￿
Lemma 4 (The Congruence Principle): it is weakly optimal for the contracting agents
to begin by signing a preliminary agreement which establishes how the agents will share the
pro￿ts from the venture.
Proof of Lemma 4: Let ￿
j
l 2 fRk;Rk;?g denote the payo⁄s communicated by agent
j = A;B to the other agent up to time l, and let I(￿
j
t) denote an investment plan specifying
a (possibly random) time t contingent on the payo⁄s communicated by the agents up to time
t, at which investment is sunk. Also, let fa(￿;￿
j
￿(￿))g denote a plan to take action a(￿;￿
j
￿(￿))
in state ￿ at (possibly random) time ￿(￿) contingent on the payo⁄s communicated by the
agents up to time ￿(￿) ￿ t + 1.
Then ￿(a(￿2;￿j
￿)) denotes the expected revenue obtained in state ￿2 under investment
plan I(￿
j
t) and action plan fa(￿;￿
j
￿(￿))g, and V denotes the maximum value of the venture
at date 0:













43We shall argue that by o⁄ering a preliminary contract such that the agents share pro￿ts,
with ￿k ￿ 0 denoting the share of pro￿ts of party k = A;B, the proposer can achieve the
highest feasible payo⁄ V ￿ UR
min.
Under such a contract each party￿ s payo⁄for any given subsequent investment plan I(￿
j
t)










Thus both agents have aligned objectives on the choice of investment and action plan given
any ￿k ￿ 0 and will agree on a plan that achieves V . It then su¢ ces for the proposer to
choose ￿B such that
￿BEf￿
￿(￿)￿(a(￿;￿
j
￿(￿))) ￿ ￿
tI(￿
j
t)g = U
R
min￿
44